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Abstract: Evidence of gender differences in cooperation in social dilemmas is inconclusive. This 
paper experimentally elicits unconditional contributions, a contribution vector (cooperative 
preferences), and beliefs about the level of others’ contributions in variants of the public goods game. 
We show that existing inconclusive results can be understood and completely explained when 
controlling for beliefs and underlying cooperative preferences. Robustness checks based on data from 
around 450 additional independent observations around the world confirm our main empirical results: 
Women are significantly more often classified as conditionally cooperative than men, while men are 
more likely to be free riders. Beliefs play an important role in shaping unconditional contributions, and 
they seem to be more malleable or sensitive to subtle cues for women than for men. 
 
JEL Classification: C91, D64, H41 
Keywords: Public goods, conditional cooperation, gender, experiment. 
                                                          
* Financial support from the Swedish Research Council (Vetenskapsrådet), from Formas through the program Human 
Cooperation to Manage Natural Resources (COMMONS), and the Ideenfonds of the University of Munich (financed through 
the excellence initiative) is gratefully acknowledged. Matzat received financial support from the German Science Foundation 
through GRK 801. We further thank the Munich Experimental Laboratory for Economic and Social Sciences (MELESSA). 
a Department of Economics, University of Munich, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, D-80539 Munich, Germany; E-mail: 
nadja.furtner@lrz.uni-muenchen.de. 
b Department of Economics, University of Munich, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, D-80539 Munich, Germany; E-mail: 
martin.kocher@lrz.uni-muenchen.de. (Corresponding author) 
c Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg, Box 640, 405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden; E-mail: 
peter.martinsson@economics.gu.se. 
d Department of Economics, University of Munich, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, D-80539 Munich, Germany; E-mail: 
dominik.matzat@lrz.uni-muenchen.de. 
e Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg, Box 640, 405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden; E-mail: 
conny.wollbrant@economics.gu.se. 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
While research on gender differences in cooperative and altruistic behavior is abundant, conclusions 
remain mixed and inconclusive (Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Croson and Gneezy, 2009). A main 
general problem in assessing gender effects is the obvious impossibility of inducing exogenous 
treatment variation on the variable of interest, namely gender. As a consequence, reported differences 
in the behavior of men and women from laboratory experiments capture residuals of effects that are 
not controlled for by other variables in the empirical model used by the researcher. However, there 
still is structure in the empirical results: In their authoritative survey, Croson and Gneezy (2009) 
conclude that women are more sensitive than men to social cues or subtle changes in the design or 
framing of a given interaction. Interestingly, recent research by Kuhn and Villeval (2015) shows that 
women are more likely to self-select into cooperative incentive schemes and that they are more 
inclined to demonstrate their cooperativeness in front of others (Charness and Rusticchini, 2011). We 
complement these findings in the present study by providing evidence on gender differences in 
cooperative preferences. Cooperative preferences and beliefs differ markedly in our study, which is 
based on a large data set from experiments on five continents. We conclude that gender differences in 
the underlying cooperative preferences and belief structures should not be disregarded. 
More specifically, we assemble a large data set from various cooperation experiments based on 
the seminal voluntary contribution mechanism for public goods provision (Ledyard, 1995; Zelmer, 
2003; Chaudhuri, 2011). The voluntary contribution mechanism captures the important trade-off in all 
social dilemmas between individual rationality implying a Pareto-dominated outcome and collective 
rationality leading to a social optimum. Most importantly, our data is based on a design, introduced by 
Fischbacher et al. (2001) and validated by Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) and Fischbacher et al. 
(2012), that allows for the fully incentivized elicitation of a complete vector of conditional 
contributions to the public good, as well as of unconditional contributions and of beliefs about 
unconditional contributions. The method permits the construction of an individual reaction function, 
providing information on the preferred contribution level for each possible average contribution of 
other group members. Based on this reaction function, individuals can be assigned a contributor type 
according to a standard taxonomy of commonly submitted contribution patterns as introduced by 
Fischbacher et al. (2001). Predominant types are the familiar free-riders, who always contributes zero 
regardless of the (expected) contributions of other group members, and conditional cooperators, who 
increase their contributions with the (expected) increase of others’ contributions. To our knowledge, 
we are the first to use this experimental setup to study gender differences in cooperation in a large-
scale study. 
A main advantage of the approach is that it allows us to disentangle differences in beliefs from 
differences in cooperative preferences, and differences in cooperative preferences from actual 
cooperation behavior. Both turn out to be important for understanding existing results concerning 
gender differences in the literature. In other words, by only eliciting cooperation behavior in social 
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dilemmas, it is likely that relevant differences remain overlooked. Eliciting a full contribution 
schedule following the approach by Fischbacher et al. (2001) provides a much more detailed picture of 
potential differences in cooperation between men and women than just unconditional contributions as 
it completely eliminates strategic uncertainty, which may otherwise trigger different responses across 
sexes. 
As already mentioned, the results in the existing experimental literature regarding gender effects 
in cooperation are rather inconclusive. While some studies provide evidence that women are more 
cooperative in social dilemmas, others find the opposite, and still others report no significant effects at 
all. In public goods games, lower voluntary unconditional contributions of women are reported by Sell 
and Wilson (1991), Sell et al. (1993), and Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1993). Replicating the latter 
study, however, Cadsby and Maynes (1998) do not find any gender differences. Sell et al. (1993), 
Solow and Kirkwood (2002), Chermak and Krause (2002), and Andreoni and Petrie (2008) also find 
no significant differences in the contributions of men and women. Conflicting results are reported by 
Stockard et al. (1988), Nowell and Tinkler (1994), and Seguino et al. (1996), who show that women 
contribute more than men. Frank et al. (1993) find women to cooperate significantly more than men in 
a prisoner’s dilemma game. Ortmann and Tichy (1999) find the same result, but only for the first 
round – a temporary effect also documented by Mason et al. (1991).1 
It is conceivable that some of the inconclusiveness arises from different empirical protocols and 
different experimental designs in the studies at hand (see also Eckel and Grossman, 2008, for a 
discussion). However, if an incentive-compatible mechanism allows for a closer look at cooperative 
preferences and beliefs across gender – such as the one proposed by Fischbacher et al. (2001) – it 
might add important insights to the existing literature. Our main experiment covers 144 German 
subjects, of whom 89 are female. Since we implement a one-shot game, all observations are 
independent. In order to address the robustness of our findings, we contrast the results from this 
experiment with the results from previous experiments that some authors of this paper have conducted 
in various places on five continents following almost exactly the same experimental design. While the 
nature of an international sample entails small differences between the locations (such as in the 
language of instruction, remuneration, and composition of the subject pool), we have much more 
control over the data than in a standard meta study, as all experiments have been conducted by the 
authors themselves (including their co-authors and potential helpers). 
Our empirical results provide a clear picture: Women are significantly more often classified as 
conditionally cooperative than men, while men are more likely to be classified as free-riders. Once 
classified as conditionally cooperative, there is no difference at all between men and women. This 
                                                          
1 For reviews of the literature on gender effects in social dilemmas, see Eckel and Grossman (2008) and Croson and Gneezy 
(2009). Croson and Gneezy (2009) provide references to the older psychological literature that uses the prisoners’ dilemma 
game in order to study gender effects in cooperation. Since these survey papers provide an excellent overview of the 
literature, we refrain from adding a full literature review. 
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means that the sensitivity of one’s own contribution to the average contribution of other group 
members is the same across the two genders. The key to understanding the inconclusive results in the 
literature seems to be beliefs.  
For management and economic policy applications of cooperative behavior, it seems important 
to seize the efficiency-enhancing potential from the intrinsic inclination of women to reciprocate the 
cooperative behavior of others. Setting a good example in a work team or providing seed money in a 
charity drive should, for example, have a stronger impact on women than men, on average. For 
instance, women become less generous in fund-raising compared with men when it is easy to avoid the 
solicitor (DellaVigna et al., 2013). While we did not test the hypothesis experimentally, it seems that 
beliefs are more malleable or more sensitive to subtle (social) cues for women than for men. This is in 
line with the conclusion in Croson and Gneezy (2009). In other words, women and men have different 
underlying inclinations to cooperate, but how these underlying preferences play out in a given 
environment depends on beliefs and, ultimately, on the (social) context. A host of implications 
regarding optimal assembling of teams and introduction of leadership in team work follow from our 
results. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we describe the design of our 
experiment. In Section 3 we present and discuss our results. Section 4 includes the robustness checks 
with data from other studies. Finally, our conclusions follow in Section 5. 
 
 
2. Experimental design 
2.1 One-shot public goods game 
To investigate both cooperative behavior and underlying preferences for cooperation, we use the 
design of the one-shot public goods experiment developed by Fischbacher et al. (2001) and, 
additionally, ask about beliefs. Hence, the design consists of three stages: (i) an unconditional 
contribution, (ii) the elicitation of a contribution schedule, and (iii) the elicitation of subjects’ beliefs 
about others’ average unconditional contributions.2 
All subjects are randomly matched into groups of four. The subjects receive an initial 
endowment of 20 experimental points each and then simultaneously have to decide how to allocate 
them.3 The two options are to either keep the points for themselves or invest some or all of them in a 
public good. The invested amount, an integer that satisfies 0 ≤ 𝑐𝑖 ≤ 20, is henceforth referred to as 
the unconditional contribution. The sum of all contributions to the public good is multiplied by 1.6 
                                                          
2 See also Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) or Gächter and Renner (2010) for the elicitation of beliefs in such a setup. 
3 Each experimental point earned in stage 1 or 2 was later exchanged for 0.33 euro. The exchange rate was announced at the 
beginning of the experiment. 
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and divided equally among all group members. This leads to the following payoff function for subject 
𝑖, which is linear in the public good contribution 
                                                            𝜋𝑖 = 20 − 𝑐𝑖 + 0.4 ∑ 𝑐𝑗
4
𝑗=1
,                                                          (1) 
where 𝑐𝑖 denotes the contribution of subject 𝑖 and the sum of 𝑐𝑗 denotes the contributions of all 
group members to the public good. The marginal per capita return (MPCR) from investing in the 
public good is 0.4. From an individual perspective, free-riding (i.e., 𝑐𝑖 = 0) is a dominant strategy for 
every subject. Since the sum of marginal returns is larger than 1, however, contributing the entire 
endowment is the optimal choice from a collective perspective (i.e., maximizing efficiency). The 
decision is made only once and anonymously, thus there are no incentives to build a reputation. 
In the second stage, without any feedback on stage 1 outcomes, all subjects are asked to 
complete a contribution table. The contribution table includes all possible average contributions of the 
three other players in the group, rounded to integers and ranging from 0 to 20 points. For each of these 
21 possible averages, subjects indicate how much they would contribute to the public good if these 
were the average contributions to the public good (i.e., we use a variant of the strategy vector method). 
The contributions in the table are referred to as conditional contributions as they state how much a 
subject is willing to contribute conditional on the average contribution of her three group members. 
Both the unconditional and the conditional contributions can determine final payoffs. Incentive 
compatibility is ensured by applying the following mechanism: In each group, one group member is 
randomly selected by the roll of a four-sided dice.4 For this group member the conditional contribution 
is payoff-relevant, whereas for the other three group members their unconditional contributions are. 
More specifically, the three unconditional contributions in a group and the corresponding conditional 
contribution (for the specific average of the three unconditional contributions) determine the sum of 
points contributed to the public good. Individual earnings are then calculated according to equation 
(1). 
In the third stage, again without any feedback on stage 2 outcomes, we elicit subjects’ beliefs by 
asking for guesses on the average unconditional contribution of the other group members (rounded to 
integers). Note that this stage was not announced in the instructions to avoid any potential influence on 
the elicitation of the unconditional and conditional contributions and to avoid hedging. The question 
and the incentive mechanism were described on the computer screen. Like in Fischbacher and Gächter 
(2010) and Gächter and Renner (2010), we pay subjects for the accuracy of their guesses to create 
stronger incentives for truthful revelation. We implement the following payment schedule: If a 
                                                          
4 At the beginning of the experiment, each group member is randomly assigned a number from one to four. After all 
decisions have been made, one of the participants in a session is randomly selected by the computer. The selected participant 
then rolls the dice, monitored by the experimenter. This procedure ensures that the participants regard the random mechanism 
that determines the group member for whom the conditional contribution is to become payoff-relevant as fully credible. 
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subject’s guess coincides with the (rounded) average unconditional contribution of her group 
members, she gets 9 additional points. If it differs by one point (two points), she receives 6 (3) points. 
Any deviation larger than two points from the true average contribution level leads to zero earnings 
from this stage. 
 
2.2 Procedure 
We conducted the computer-based experiments with the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) and the 
organizational software ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). A total of 144 undergraduate students (89 women 
and 55 men) from any discipline except economics participated in six sessions (24 subjects in each) at 
the University of Munich, Germany. Unlike a few of the previous studies, we did not impose a special 
gender composition of groups or sessions. There were two additional parts of the experiment, but these 
took place after the public goods game.5 In order to avoid any effects from earnings in one part or 
stage on subsequent behavior, all decisions and results in the different stages and parts were only 
revealed at the end of the entire experiment. The sessions lasted up to 1½ hours and the average payoff 
was 16.98 euro, including a show-up payment of 4.00 euro. The average payoff from the public goods 
game used in the following analysis was 8.66 euro. 
Subjects received written instructions at the beginning of each experimental part (see Appendix 
B). The instructions were read aloud, and we gave the opportunity to ask questions in private. To 
ensure that all subjects had understood correctly, they had to complete some computerized exercises 
requiring them to compute the payoffs for different contribution levels in the game. We started the 
public goods game only after all exercises had been completed successfully. Directly before payment, 
subjects answered a post-experimental questionnaire including some questions related to socio-
economic factors. Among those was a question about the subject’s gender. Except for this question, 
gender was never mentioned or made salient in the experiment. In fact, the post-experimental 
questionnaires generally contain the question for gender in all experiments conducted at the 
laboratory. No subject could have guessed that the interest of the study was in gender differences in 
cooperation. Finally, subjects were paid in private and dismissed. 
 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Gender and unconditional cooperation 
Starting with unconditional contributions, we find that our experimental participants contribute on 
average 6.75 points (33.8% of their endowment) to the public good and expect their group members to 
contribute on average 7.24 points (36.2%). The levels we find in Munich in Germany correspond well 
                                                          
5 For details see Kocher et al. (2015, 2016). 
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with previous findings in German-speaking countries (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fischbacher and 
Gächter, 2010; Kocher et al., 2008).6 
As shown in Table 1, we find differences between male and female participants. The 
unconditional contributions of women are significantly higher than those of men (two-sided Mann-
Whitney U-test, p = 0.02, N = 144). On average, women contribute 7.60 points (38.0% of their 
endowment) to the public good, whereas men contribute only 5.38 points (26.9%). It is important to 
add that women on average believe in a higher contribution by others than men. The corresponding 
expected contributions are 7.73 (38.7%) and 6.45 (32.3%) points, respectively, and the difference is 
significant at the 10% level according to a two-sided Mann-Whitney U-test (p = 0.06, N = 144). The 
slight self-serving bias, i.e., expecting others to contribute more than oneself, is consistent with the 
findings in Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) and is caused to a large degree by free-riders (more on this 
in Section 3.3). 
 
Result 1. Women’s unconditional contributions are significantly higher than men’s. Women also hold 
a more optimistic belief about their group members’ contribution levels than men. 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (N = 144) 
 Unconditional contributions Expected contributions 
All subjects 6.75 (33.8%) 7.24 (36.2%) 
Men  5.38 (26.9%) 6.45 (32.3%) 
Women 7.60 (38.0%) 7.73 (38.7%) 
H0: No difference between men and women 
(two-sided Mann-Whitney U-test (p-value)) 
0.02 0.06 
 
To disentangle beliefs from the gender effect, we run a tobit regression as shown in Table 2. In 
line with the results of previous studies, we observe beliefs to have a positive and highly significant 
impact on unconditional contributions. The more an individual expects others to contribute, the more 
s(he) contributes herself/himself. When controlling for beliefs, women still contribute more than men 
at the 10% level of significance, suggesting that differences in beliefs do not fully explain the 
observed gender gap in unconditional contributions. In Model 2 in Table 2, we also include an 
interaction term for gender and beliefs but find no evidence that a change in belief has a different 
impact on unconditional contributions across gender. Note, however, that the gender dummy and the 
interaction become insignificant in an OLS regression that we conducted as a sensitivity analysis, 
while the belief variable remains highly significant. 
                                                          
6 Results in Russia are provided by Herrmann and Thöni (2009). Volk et al. (2012) study the temporal stability of conditional 
cooperation. 
8 
 
 
Result 2. Subjects’ unconditional contributions increase in the belief about others’ contributions. 
Controlling for beliefs, women still contribute more than men, but the effect is borderline significant 
or insignificant depending on the econometric model. 
 
 
Table 2: Explaining unconditional contributions 
 Model 1  Model 2 
 Coef. Std. Error p-value  Coef.  Std. Error p-value 
Belief 1.41*** 0.12 <0.01  1.58*** 0.20 <0.01 
Woman 1.57* 0.94 0.10  3.60* 2.04 0.08 
Belief * Woman - - -  -0.27 0.24 0.26 
Constant 5.46*** 1.16 <0.01  6.67*** 1.63 <0.01 
N 144    144   
Censored tobit regressions. *** Difference significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 
10% level. Coef. = coefficient; Std. = standard. 
 
 
3.2 Gender and cooperative preferences 
Following Fischbacher et al. (2001), we categorize subjects into four contributor types based on their 
submitted conditional contribution schedule. A subject is classified as a Conditional Cooperator if 
either his/her conditional contribution increases weakly monotonically with the average contribution 
of the other group members or the relationship between his/her own and the others’ average 
contributions is positive and significant at the 1% significance level using a Spearman rank correlation 
coefficient (based on the classifications used in Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fischbacher and Gächter, 
2010). Hump-shaped Contributors, sometimes called triangle contributors, are subjects who show 
weakly monotonically increasing contributions (or increasing with a Spearman rank correlation 
coefficient at the 1% significance level) up to a given level of others’ contributions (the inflection 
point); above that level, their conditional contributions decrease weakly monotonically (or according 
to a significant Spearman rank correlation coefficient at the 1% level). A Free-rider is a subject who 
exhibits a conditional contribution of zero for all levels of the other members’ average contributions. 
Finally, those who cannot be categorized into any of the three classes above are referred to as Other. 
We find that overall, 18.8% of our participants can be classified as free-riders, 55.6% as 
conditional cooperators, 11.1% as hump-shaped, and 14.6% as others. This distribution is very similar 
to the distributions reported in other studies on conditional cooperation, e.g., Fischbacher et al. (2001) 
and Kocher et al. (2008) in German-speaking countries. As can be seen in Figure 1, we find substantial 
differences between men and women. 61.8% of the women but only 45.5% of the men can be 
classified as conditional cooperators. On the other hand, 30.9% of the men but only 11.2% of the 
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women are free-riders. Men are also more likely to be classified as hump-shaped contributors (18.2% 
vs. 6.7%), whereas non-standard contribution patterns are shown more often by women (5.5% vs. 
20.2%). The distributions of types differ significantly between genders at the 1% significance level 
(Fisher’s exact test; N = 144). 
 
Result 3. Women are classified as conditionally cooperative significantly more frequently than men, 
whereas men are more often classified as free-riders. 
 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of types by gender 
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Table 3: Unconditional contributions and beliefs by gender and type 
Type of subject 
Number of 
subjects  
Unconditional 
contributions  Beliefs 
 
 
Men 
(n=55) 
Women 
(n=89) 
 
Men Women  Men Women 
 
All types 100% 100%  5.38 7.60 ** 6.45 7.73 * 
Free-rider 30.9% 11.2%  1.41 0.50  3.88 4.80  
Conditional cooperator 45.5% 61.8%  8.12 8.14  8.00 7.82  
Hump-shaped 18.2% 6.7%  4.90 8.83  6.80 9.17  
Other 5.5% 20.2%  6.67 9.44  7.00 8.61  
** Difference significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level, (based on two-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests). 
 
Combining types and unconditional contributions, we do not find significant differences in 
contributions between men and women within any particular type (according to two-sided Mann-
Whitney U-tests). The similarity in the unconditional contributions of men and women becomes 
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particularly apparent when looking at conditional cooperators – the most common type for both 
genders – in Table 3 (average contributions of male and female conditional cooperators are 8.12 and 
8.14 points, respectively). The same conclusion can be drawn regarding average beliefs within types, 
as there are no significant differences between men and women. 
 
Result 4. There are no significant differences in unconditional contributions or beliefs between men 
and women within each type category. 
 
Table 4 extends the regressions of Table 2 by introducing a dummy variable for subject type. 
We take free-rider as the base category and find, not surprisingly, that all other types contribute 
significantly higher amounts unconditionally. Moreover, the coefficient for the belief is again highly 
significant. Most importantly, however, our gender dummy variable becomes insignificant at all 
conventional levels, indicating that we have explained the gender gap in the unconditional 
contribution. To be precise, the difference in unconditional contribution between men and women 
seems to be due to both differences in beliefs and differences in the distribution of cooperative types 
across gender. 
 
Result 5. The gender gap in the unconditional contribution seems to be caused by both gender 
differences in beliefs and gender differences in the underlying distribution of cooperative preferences. 
 
In a last step of our analysis we take a closer look at the conditional contribution schedules. 
Table 5 investigates gender differences based on conditional contributions. It gives an indication of the 
sensitivity of the reaction function to others’ average contributions, using a tobit specification with 
robust standard errors because of the 21 observations at the individual level. If we consider all 
participants, we observe the expected conditional dependence and a significant gender effect, but 
Model 1 lumps together all contributor types. Model 2 restricts the sample to only those who have 
been classified as conditional cooperators. Even though the slope of the conditional cooperation 
function can be very different across different conditional cooperators (in other words, the self-serving 
bias of individuals can be different), there is no significant gender effect. Almost by definition, the 
sensitivity to others’ average contributions is stronger among conditional cooperators (in Model 2) 
than in the entire sample (in Model 1). Once one is classified as a conditional cooperator, there are no 
further gender differences. 
 
Result 6. There is no gender gap in the conditional contributions of participants classified as 
conditional cooperators. 
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Table 4: Explaining unconditional contributions (2) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coef. Std. Error p-value Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
p-value 
Belief 1.25*** 0.11 <0.01 1.33*** 0.19 <0.01 
Woman 1.34 0.92 0.89 1.14 2.00 0.57 
Belief * Woman - - - -0.13 0.23 0.57 
Type:        
     Conditional cooperator 7.65*** 1.50 <0.01 7.57*** 1.51 <0.01 
     Hump-shaped 5.31*** 1.83 <0.01 5.28*** 1.84 <0.01 
     Other 8.29*** 1.77 <0.01 8.25*** 1.77 <0.01 
Constant -9.56*** 1.57 <0.01 -10.27*** 1.89 <0.01 
N 144   144   
Censored tobit regressions. *** Difference significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 
10% level. Type: Base category is free-rider. Coef. = coefficient; Std. = standard. 
 
 
Table 5: Explaining conditional contributions 
 
Model 1 
 (all subjects) 
Model 2 
(only Conditional Cooperators) 
 Coef. Std. 
Error 
p-value Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
p-value 
Others’ average 
contribution 
0.62*** 0.09 <0.01 0.98*** 0.09 <0.01 
Woman 5.10*** 1.52 <0.01 1.79 1.13  
Others’ average 
contrib. * Woman -0.03 0.11  -0.12 0.10  
Constant -4.92*** 1.30 <0.01 -2.80*** 1.09 0.01 
N 3024  - 1680  - 
Censored tobit regressions. *** Difference significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 
10% level. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. Coef. = coefficient; Std. = standard. 
 
 
4. Robustness analysis: data from five continents 
In the light of inconclusive results in previous studies on gender and cooperation, it is natural to be 
very cautious regarding the robustness of our results. We have a quite homogenous subject pool of 144 
mostly German undergraduate students, and it could be the case that our results are subject-pool 
specific or country-specific. Hence, we check here to what extent we can corroborate our results when 
taking data sets of recent public goods experiments that subsets of the authors of the present paper 
conducted for other reasons than studying gender effects. The main finding of this robustness exercise 
is that our main result – women are relatively more often classified as conditional cooperators whereas 
men are relatively more often classified as free-riders – is confirmed. 
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More precisely, in the following we look at gender effects in four different studies conducted in 
six different countries on five continents, namely Austria, Colombia, Ethiopia, Japan, USA, and 
Vietnam. Kocher et al. (2008) investigated conditional cooperation in Austria, Japan, and USA. The 
Colombian data are from Martinsson et al. (2009, 2015). Martinsson et al. (2016) conducted the 
experiments in Ethiopia, and the data for Vietnam is from Martinsson et al. (2013). The studies differ 
in some small details, but they all use the same basic design as in Fischbacher et al. (2001). 
 
Table 6: Number of observations by gender and country7 
Country Men Women All 
Austria 23 12 35 
Colombia 127 84 211 
Ethiopia 55 28 83 
Japan 30 6 36 
USA 19 17 36 
Vietnam 28 20 48 
All 282 167 449 
 
Table 6 provides an overview of the number of observations that the studies rely on, broken up 
by gender and country. As the number of participants is too small to draw robust conclusions 
regarding gender effects for each country separately and as it is not our aim to study culture- or 
country-specific effects, we pool the data. This gives us a large data set that allows assessing the 
geographical universality of our main results from Section 3. More detailed information about the data 
at country level is included in Appendix A. 
Pooling all data from Table 6 we again find considerable differences in the conditional 
contribution patterns across men and women. Table 7 shows that 61% of women but only 52% of men 
can be classified as conditional cooperators, whereas 21% of men but only 8% of women are free-
riders. Overall, the distribution of types differs significantly across the sexes (Kruskal-Wallis, p = 
0.02; N = 449).  
 
Result 7. The presence of gender differences in type distribution – men being relatively more 
frequently free-riders and women being relatively more frequently conditional cooperators – is a 
robust finding. 
 
                                                          
7 We have no information about the gender of one participant in each of the three countries Austria, Colombia, and Ethiopia. 
Thus, these three persons are excluded from the analysis. The study in Japan was conducted at the Technical University of 
Tokyo, which explains the very low number of female participants. 
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Table 7: Contribution type by gender in pooled data 
Type of subject Men Women 
Free-rider 21% 
(59) 
8% 
(14) 
Conditional cooperator 52% 
(147) 
61% 
(102) 
Hump-shaped 10% 
(27) 
7% 
(11) 
Other 18% 
(49) 
24% 
(40) 
All 100% 
(282) 
100% 
(167) 
 
We briefly summarize results on unconditional contributions and beliefs from the studies shown 
in Table 6. Notice that beliefs are not elicited in Kocher et al. (2008). Martinsson et al. (2013), and 
Martinsson et al. (2009, 2015) use unconditional contributions that range from 0 to 60 points. If we 
compute average unconditional contributions over all studies (dividing contributions in the latter 
studies by three to make them comparable), we find that women contribute slightly more than men, 
but the difference fails to reach significance on conventional levels (means = 7.08 vs. 6.63; two-sided 
Mann-Whitney U-test, p = 0.12, N = 448). Similarly, average beliefs of women (mean = 7.16) are 
higher than those of men (mean = 6.20) overall, although the difference is not significant (two-sided 
Mann-Whitney U-test, p = 0.40, N = 259). This does not mean that there are no differences between 
the studies. In Vietnam and one of the studies in Colombia (Martinson et al, 2009), men hold more 
optimistic beliefs than women. While in Vietnam women still contribute more unconditionally than 
men, this is not the case for the study in Colombia. In this study, women contribute slightly less than 
men unconditionally (means = 7.42 vs. 8.00; two-sided Mann-Whitney U-test, p = 0.74, N = 94). 
Women are, however, still more often conditionally cooperative (67% vs. 56%) and less often 
classified as free-riders (4% vs. 19%). Hence, looking at the unconditional contributions alone and not 
accounting for beliefs or conditional contributions might provide a distorted picture when assessing 
cooperativeness. While beliefs and unconditional contributions of men and women vary across studies 
(and might depend very much on elicitation details), the distribution of contribution types and the 
resulting gender differences in cooperative preferences are very robust. 
A final result is noteworthy, since it confirms an important previous finding. Andreoni and 
Vesterlund (2001) find that the generosity of men and women depends on its “price.” When cheap, 
men are more generous, whereas women are more generous when such behavior is more expensive. A 
second finding is less often noted. Andreoni and Vesterlund’s experiments provide evidence that men 
are more likely to be either perfectly selfish or perfectly selfless, whereas women are more likely to be 
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in-between. The public goods game is, of course, different from the dictator game, but we observe a 
related phenomenon in our data. Men more often unconditionally contribute zero than women (30.3% 
vs. 15.3%), but they are also slightly more likely to contribute their entire endowment (6% vs. 3%), 
when we look at the overall sample (including Germany). Figure 2 shows the distribution of 
unconditional contributions across all studies. 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of unconditional contributions by gender 
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Experimental evidence of gender differences in cooperation has so far been mixed and inconclusive. 
We contribute to the ongoing debate by combining unconditional contributions, cooperative 
preferences (a contingent contribution schedule), and beliefs on the cooperation of others. One asset of 
this study is that it allows for comparison of its results with a set of experiments conducted on five 
continents, and thus it is possible to check for universality and robustness. 
Our results indicate a clear gender gap in cooperative preferences. Women are significantly more 
likely to be classified as conditional cooperators; i.e., if they know that others contribute (more), they 
are more likely to contribute as well. Men are more frequently classified as free-riders. There are no 
differences in the unconditional contribution behavior within each type category. Most importantly, 
conditional cooperators behave almost identically across the genders when it comes to unconditional 
contributions. This general pattern of preferences holds around the world. Our data shows that these 
underlying preferences may play out differently in studies that only examine unconditional 
contributions, which is the most common type of experimental study conducted.  
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With our main results in mind, we think that at least three aspects of gender differences in 
cooperation deserve more attention in the future. First, determinants of beliefs are not well understood, 
in general. However, differences in beliefs contribute to the gender gap in cooperative behavior, and 
thus more work is needed that analyzes the foundations and the malleability of beliefs (e.g., 
Dufwenberg et al., 2011). Second, country- or culture-specific effects as well as the context of the 
social dilemma (framing effects, etc.) might have a strong influence on the gender gap in cooperation 
through beliefs. If it is true that women are more reactive to social cues than men, unconditional 
contributions alone will exhibit large variation. Small-scale experimental studies therefore bear the 
risk of yielding inconclusive or even misleading results. Moreover, the main alternative, i.e., large-
scale studies, may not be much better, as they too could be affected by the specific context or social 
cues. Meta studies could be a viable alternative, or smaller-scale experimental studies with a 
systematic variation in context and cues. Third, our results have implications for the implementation of 
repeated public goods games. Future experiments can test whether the behavioral patterns across 
gender in repeated public goods games are well-predicted based on the connection of beliefs and 
underlying cooperative preferences, along the lines of Fischbacher and Gächter (2010). 
Methodologically, we want to emphasize the importance of looking at complete reaction 
functions and beliefs when studying gender differences. Unless this is done, empirical results provide 
a non-comprehensive picture. Such aspects are not exclusively important for the scientific analysis of 
cooperative preferences and cooperation behavior. Obviously, policy recommendations should differ if 
one gender is unconditionally or conditionally more cooperative.  If women have a stronger intrinsic 
inclination to reciprocate cooperative behavior of others, implications for optimally assembling teams 
or introducing leadership in teamwork follow immediately. Given our results, it seems important to 
initiate cooperation when women are present. Interestingly, the existing literature on leading by 
example in social dilemmas (e.g., Gächter et al., 2012; Arbak and Villeval, 2013) mainly focuses on 
gender differences in leadership rather than gender differences in following contingent on the example 
given by the leader. Our results provide a directed hypothesis: Setting a good example in a work team 
or providing seed money in a charity drive should have a stronger impact on women than men, on 
average. 
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Appendix  
A. Further results 
Table A.1: Distribution of types, unconditional contributions, and beliefs by gender and country 
Type of subject Austria Colombia Japan USA Vietnam Ethiopia 
 Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Free-rider 0.26 
(6) 
0.17 
(2) 
0.13 
(17) 
0.04 
(3) 
0.33 
(10) 
0.50 
(3) 
0.16 
(3) 
0.00 
(0) 
0.04 
(1) 
0.05 
(1) 
0.40 
(22) 
0.18 
(5) 
Conditional 
cooperator 
0.52 
(12) 
0.50 
(6) 
0.68 
(86) 
0.70 
(59) 
0.43  
(13) 
0.33 
(2) 
0.74 
(14) 
0.94 
(16) 
0.46 
(13) 
0.55 
(11) 
0.16 
(9) 
0.29 
(8) 
Hump-shaped 0.13 
(3) 
0.08 
(1) 
0.06 
(8) 
0.04 
(3) 
0.13 
(4) 
0.00 
(0) 
0.00 
(0) 
0.00 
(0) 
0.11 
(3) 
0.05 
(1) 
0.16 
(9) 
0.21 
(6) 
Other 0.09 
(2) 
0.25 
(3) 
0.13 
(16) 
0.23 
(19) 
0.17 
(3) 
0.17 
(1) 
0.11 
(2) 
0.06 
(1) 
0.39 
(11) 
0.35 
(7) 
0.27 
(15) 
0.32 
(9) 
All 1.00 
(23) 
1.00 
(12) 
1.00 
(127) 
1.00 
(84) 
1.00 
(30) 
1.00 
(6) 
1.00 
(19) 
1.00 
(17) 
1.00 
(28) 
1.00 
(20) 
1.00 
(55) 
1.00 
(28) 
Mean unconditional 
contribution 
7.87 5.50 7.91 8.43 7.93 5.50 8.21 8.00 5.07 5.30 2.73 4.79 
Mean belief - - 7.03 7.41 - - - - 6.42 6.08 - - 
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Table A.1 displays country-specific data on the distribution of types, unconditional contributions, and 
beliefs. In order to make the data directly comparable, we re-classify some individuals from the study 
of Kocher et al. (2008). In the original study, subjects were classified as conditional cooperators only 
if they submitted a contribution schedule that was weakly monotonically increasing with the average 
contribution of the other group members (with at least on strict increase in the contribution schedule). 
All other studies use a slightly different classification mechanism (based on Fischbacher et al., 2011), 
for which subjects are also classified as conditional cooperators if they have a highly significant (at the 
1% level) positive Spearman rank correlation between their own and others’ contributions. As a 
consequence, we re-classify one (male) individual from the USA and three individuals (two men, one 
woman) from Austria as conditional cooperators instead of “Others”. Furthermore, notice that 
unconditional contributions and beliefs in Colombia and Vietnam are divided by three, as the 
contribution range in these experiments was 0–60 points. 
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B. Experimental instructions1 
 
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for participating! 
Please stop talking to other participants from now on. 
 
General 
This is an experiment on economic decision making. You will earn “real” money that will be paid out to you in 
cash at the end of the experiment. During the experiment all participants will be asked to make decisions. Your 
decisions and the decisions of other participants determine your earnings from the experiment according to the 
following rules. 
 
The experiment will last two hours. If you have any questions or if anything is unclear, please raise your hand, 
and one of the experimenters will come to you and answer your questions privately. 
During the experiment a part of your earnings will be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment all 
points that you earn will be converted into euro at the exchange rate of 
 
1 point = 0.33 euro (3 points = 1 euro). 
 
In the interest of clarity, we will only use male terms in the instructions. 
 
Anonymity 
You will learn neither during nor after the experiment, with whom you interact(ed) in the experiment. The other 
participants will neither during nor after the experiment learn, how much you earn(ed). We never link names and 
data from experiments. At the end of the experiment you will be asked to sign a receipt regarding your earnings 
which serves only as a proof for our sponsor. The latter does not receive any other data from the experiment. 
 
Means of help 
You will find a pen at your table which you, please, leave behind on the table when the experiment is over. 
While you make your decisions, a clock will run down at the top of your computer screen. This clock will give 
you an orientation how long you should need to make your decisions. But you can nevertheless exceed this time. 
The input screens will not be dismissed once time is over. However, the pure output screens (here you do not 
have to make a decision) will be dismissed. 
 
Experiment 
The experiment consists of three parts2. You will receive instructions for a part after the previous part has ended. 
The parts of the experiment are completely independent; decisions in one part have no consequences for your 
earnings in later parts. The sum of earnings from the different parts will constitute your total earnings from the 
experiment. 
                                                          
1 Translated from the original German version. 
2 Instructions for Parts 2 and 3 can be found in the Appendix to Kocher et al. (2016). 
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Part I 
 
The decision situation 
The basic decision situation will be explained to you in the following. Afterwards you will find control questions 
on the screen which should raise your familiarity with the decision situation.  
You will be a member of a group consisting of 4 people. Each group member has to decide on the allocation of 
20 points. You can put these 20 points into your private account or you can put them fully or partially into a 
group account. Each point you do not put into the group account will automatically remain in your private 
account. 
 
Your income from the private account: 
You will earn one point for each point you put into your private account. For example, if you put 20 points into 
your private account (and therefore do not put anything into the group account) your income will amount to 
exactly 20 points out of your private account. If you put 6 points into your private account, your income from 
this account will be 6 points. No one except you earns something from your private account. 
 
Your income from the group account: 
Each group member will profit equally from the amount you put into the group account. On the other hand, you 
will also get a payoff from the other group members’ in-payments into the group account. The income for each 
group member out of the group account will be determined as follows: 
 
 
Income from group account =  
Sum of all group members’ contributions to the group account u 0.4 
 
 
If, for example, the sum of all group members’ contributions to the group account is 60 points, then you and the 
other members of your group each earn 60 x 0.4 = 24 points out of the group account. If the four group members 
contribute a total of 10 points to the group account, you and the other members of your group each earn 10 x 0.4 
= 4 points out of the group account.  
 
Total income: 
Your total income is the sum of your income from your private account and that from the group account: 
   
 Income from your private account (= 20 – contribution to group account)  
 + Income from group account (= 0,4 u sum of contributions to group account)  
 = Total income  
   
 
Before we proceed, please try to solve the control questions on your screen. If you want to compute something, 
you can use the Windows calculator by clicking on the respective symbol on your screen.   
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Procedure of Part I 
 
Part I includes the decision situation just described to you. The decisions in Part I will only be made once. 
 
On the first screen you will be informed about your group membership number. This number will be of 
relevance later on. If you have taken note of the number, please click “next”. 
 
Then you have to make your decisions. As you know, you will have 20 points at your disposal. You can put 
them into your private account or you can put them into the group account. Each group member has to make two 
types of contribution decisions which we will refer to below as the unconditional contribution and the 
contribution table. 
 
x In the unconditional contribution case you decide how many of the 20 points you want to put into the group 
account. Please insert your unconditional contribution in the respective box on your screen. You can insert 
integer numbers only. Your contribution to the private account is determined automatically by the difference 
between 20 and your contribution to the group account. After you have chosen your unconditional contribution, 
please click “next”.  
 
x On the next screen you are asked to fill in a contribution table. In the contribution table you indicate how 
much you want to contribute to the group account for each possible average contribution of the other 
group members (rounded to the next integer). Thus, you can condition your contribution on the other group 
members’ average contribution. The contribution table looks as follows:   
 
 
 
The numbers in each of the left columns are the possible (rounded) average contributions of the other group 
members to the group account. This means, they represent the amount each of the other group members’ has put 
into the group account on average. You simply have to insert into the input boxes how many points you want to 
contribute to the group account – conditional on the indicated average contribution. You have to make an entry 
into each input box. For example, you will have to indicate how much you contribute to the group account if 
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the others contribute 0 points to the group account on average, how much you contribute if the others contribute 
1, 2, or 3 points on average, etc. You can insert any integer numbers from 0 to 20 in each input box. Once you 
have made an entry in each input box, please click “OK”.  
 
After all participants of the experiment have made an unconditional contribution and have filled in their 
contribution table, a random mechanism will select a group member from every group. Only the contribution 
table will be the payoff-relevant decision for the randomly determined subject. Only the unconditional 
contribution will be the payoff-relevant decision for the other three group members not selected by the 
random mechanism. You obviously do not know whether the random mechanism will select you when you make 
your unconditional contribution and when you fill in the contribution table. You will therefore have to think 
carefully about both types of decisions because both can become relevant for you. Two examples should make 
this clear. 
 
Example 1: Assume that the random mechanism selects you. This implies that your relevant decision will 
be your contribution table. The unconditional contribution is the relevant decision for the other three group 
members. Assume they made unconditional contributions of 0, 2, and 5 points. The average rounded contribution 
of these three group members, therefore, is 2 points ((0+2+5)/3 = 2.33).  
If you indicated in your contribution table that you will contribute 1 point to the group account if the others 
contribute 2 points on average, then the total contribution to the group account is given by 0+2+5+1=8 points. 
All group members, therefore, earn 0.4×8=3.2 points out of the group account plus their respective income from 
the private account.  
 
If, instead, you indicated in your contribution table that you would contribute 19 points if the others contribute 
two points on average, then the total contribution of the group to the group account is given by 0+2+5+19=26. 
All group members therefore earn 0.4×26=10.4 points out of the group account plus their respective income 
from the private account. 
 
Example 2: Assume that the random mechanism did not select you, implying that the unconditional 
contribution is taken as the payoff-relevant decision for you and two other group members. Assume your 
unconditional contribution to the group account is 16 points and those of the other two group members are 18 
and 20 points. The average unconditional contribution of you and the other two group members, therefore, is 18 
points (= (16+18+20)/3).  
 
If the group member whom the random mechanism selected indicates in her contribution table that she will 
contribute 1 point to the group account if the other three group members contribute on average 18 points, then 
the total contribution to the group account is given by 16+18+20+1=55 points. All group members will therefore 
earn 0.4×55=22 points out of the group account plus their respective income from the private account.  
If, instead, the randomly selected group member indicates in her contribution table that she contributes 19 points 
to the group account if the others contribute on average 18 points, then the total contribution to the group 
account is given by 16+18+20+19=73 points. All group members will therefore earn 0.4×73=29.2 points out of 
the group account plus their respective income from the private account.  
 
The random selection of the participants will be implemented as follows. A randomly selected participant will 
throw a 4-sided dice after all participants have made their unconditional contribution and have filled in their 
contribution table. She enters the thrown number into the computer thereby being monitored by the experimenter 
who confirms the correctness of the entry by password. The thrown number will then be compared with the 
group membership number, which was shown to you on the first screen. If the thrown number equals your group 
membership number, then your contribution table is payoff-relevant for you and the unconditional contribution is 
payoff-relevant for the other three group members. Otherwise, your unconditional contribution is the relevant 
decision for you. 
 
The following figure visualizes the situation in example 1. You are the person on the right side with group 
membership number 3. Number 3 was thrown and therefore your conditional contribution is payoff-relevant. For 
the other three group members the unconditional contribution is payoff-relevant. 
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You will make all your decisions only once. After the end of Part I you will get the instructions of Part II. How 
much you have earned in Part I will be revealed at the end of the experiment. 
 
